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Abstract 
Thi s  paper  in vest igat es  t he  “ edu cat ion - to ta l  facto r  product i v i t y  t rade -o f f”   in  
explain in g per  wo rker  in co me d i f ferences  between  Sub -Saharan  (un lucky)  and  G7 
( lucky)  econo mies .  Fo l lo wing Hal l  and  Jones  (1999)  and  Casel l i  (2005) ,  on  a  count ry 
basi s ,  we are  ab l e  to  s tud y sep ara te ly the  d ynamic of th e  average  years  o f school ing  
( i . e .  edu ca t ion  level ) ,  the  per  wo rker  cap i t a l ,  the  per  worker  inco me,  and  the  to ta l  
factor  p roduc t ivi ty  (TFP) .  We con f i rm,  accord in g to  the  re l a t ed  l i te ra tu re ,  th at  
ph ysi ca l  cap i ta l  and  educat ion  l eve ls  par t ia l l y  exp lain  in co me d i f ferences  b etween  
un lucky and  lucky economies .  We sho w,  ho wever ,  that  the  imp ac t  o f  ad hoc  TFP  
shocks  on  per  wo rker  in co me is  l arger  in  the  un lucky econo mies  th an  in  the  lu cky 
ones .  The resu l t  ho lds  bo th  for  n ega t ive  and  posi t i ve  shocks .  In  pa r t i cu lar ,  we f ind 
that  average TFP  vo l a t i l i t y  in  th e  “unlucky wo r ld”  i s  e igh t  t imes h igher  th an  the  “G7 
wo rld” average TFP  volat i l i t y.  As a  r esu l t  we a rgue that  th e  order  o f magni tude o f th e  
impact  h eav i ly dep ends o n  the  l eve l  o f  the  TFP  volat i l i t y .  I t  tu rns  ou t  tha t  th e  e f fec t  
o f  a  TFP  shock  on  a  r e l a t i ve  lo w per  worker  in co me gro wth  r a te  i s  h igh er .  We 
conclude b y argu in g that  the  presence o f lo w levels  o f  pe r  worker  cap i ta l  and  of 
human product iv i ty  push  the  un lucky econo mies  in to  a  pover ty t rap .  
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1. Introduction 
It is commonly believed that cross-country differences in per worker income are huge. 
Differences across countries can be attributed to differences in human capital, physical 
capital, and TFP. It is also largely accepted that standard production functions may fail in 
capturing cross-countries income differences. For example, Pritchett (1996) argues that 
data on the growth of years of schooling provide no support at all for the proposition that 
more rapid rates of growth of educational capital produce greater output growth.  He 
shows  that the estimated impact of educational capital accumulation on a widely 
accepted, growth accounting, definition of TFP growth is large, negative, and statistically 
significant. He provides three possible explanations for this puzzling result: 1) perhaps  
schooling has, on the average in the sample, created no skills; 2) perhaps the rate of 
expansion of schooling has greatly increased the supply of educated labor; 3) perhaps 
schooling has created cognitive skills but the typical institutional environment was 
sufficiently bad that these skills were devoted to privately remunerative but socially 
wasteful, or even counter-productive, activities relative to demand so that the rate of 
return has fallen over time. In showing that education is not a sufficient condition for 
growth, Pritchett (1996) does not support the idea that education is powerless, but he 
points out that these intuitive results raise the importance of identifying and undertaking 
those complementary reforms in the non-education sector that will lead to education in 
order to pay off. The Pritchett's (1996) empirical result reflects recent empirical 
regularities supporting the poor role played by education in explaining cross-country 
income differences.  
It is also largely accepted the idea that institutions stand behind the ``rules of the 
game'' of a society. Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) argue that differences in 
output per worker are fundamentally related to differences in social infrastructures across 
countries. North (1994) indicates that institutions embody the incentive structure of a 
society and are the underlying determinants of economic performance. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), and Ehrlich and Lui (1999) stress the fact that corruption 
hampers economic growth. Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemouglu et al. (2002) 
demonstrate the importance of an institutional environment in explaining economic 
growth. Thus, countries with different levels of institutional quality have different 
economic growth rates. Using geographic information system (GIS) mapping, Sachs (2001) 
presents the evidence that production technology in the tropics has lagged behind 
temperate zone technology in the two critical areas of agriculture and health, and this in 
turn opened a substantial income gap between climate zones. He focus on the difficulty of 
mobilizing energy resources in tropical economies and emphasize how such a problem 
constitutes another significant cause to the income gap.  
Mazur (2000) shows that the globalization has dramatically increased the inequality 
between and within Nations. Kremer an Maskin (2006), supporters of the anti-
globalization movement, on the other hand, put forward the idea that globalization has 
marginalized the poor in developing countries and left behind the poorest countries. 
Clinton (2000), during a session on the Indian Parliament, said that the poor must invest 
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in education to take advantage of globalization.1 The empirical evidence suggest that, 
although the average years of schooling, both in primary and secondary school (i.e. higher 
investments/aids in education), sharply increased in several poor economies during the 
last 20 years though income inequalities are still high. It has been already proved that, and 
will be found again to be true in this paper, output per worker varies enormously across 
countries. Hall and Jones (1999), on an accounting basis, show that differences in physical 
capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in output per 
worker. Differently, they find a large amount of variation in the level of the TFP  (i.e. the 
Solow residual/technological progress) across countries. At a deeper level, they also 
document that the differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore output 
per worker, are driven by differences in institutions and government  policies, which they 
call social infrastructure. Caselli (2005) argues that the observed differences in the factors 
employed in production do not totally explain most of the cross-country variation in 
income. He claims that human capital measures should account for  differences in the 
quality of schooling and in health status of the population: the age composition of the 
capital stock. For example he finds that if one disaggregates the government sector out of 
the data, the outcome may be the source of a potential reduction the unexplained 
component of total output.  
The empirical part of these two seminal contributions combines variables from two 
main data set, the PENN WORLD TABLES and the Barro-Lee educational attainment data 
set. The empirical part of this paper is most closely related to Hall and Jones (1999) and 
Caselli (2005). Thanks to this empirical scheme, education, capital and technological 
progress can be studied separately. We confirm that differences in physical capital and 
education between Sub-Saharan and G7 economies do not fully explain the huge gap in per 
worker income. As expected the TFP plays a crucial role in understanding the existence of 
a cross-country income puzzle. The unlucky economies average TFP accounts only for 
27% of the US TFP. 
 The key contribution of the present paper consists the analyzing capital, education, 
TFP and output in a time series framework, the study of the dynamic of capital 
accumulation, the construction of ad hoc technological shocks and the study of the 
difference impacts of these shocks on per worker output.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data selection. Section 3 
discusses the empirical results on output, education and technological progress, and  
studies the impact of TFP shocks on per worker income growth rates. Section 4 provides a 
theoretical supports for the poor conditions of the Sub-Saharan countries. The main 
conclusions are reported in Section 5. 
 
2. Data Description and Preliminary Analysis 
In 2010, the thirty-two Sub-Saharan countries on which we focus on had a combined 
population of 516 million and an average annual per capita income of $3,270.00 (i.e. $9 
per day). To exploit cross-country income differences, we use the G7 economies as a 
benchmark. The complete list of countries is presented in Table 2.1. In 2010, the G7 had a 
population of 735 million an average annual per capita income of $35,278.00 (i.e. $98 per 
                                                          
1 See Clinton (2000). Address to a Joint Session of the Indian Parliament, March 2000. 
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day). Average savings to GDP ratios over the sample 1980-2011 are 14.87% and 20.69% 
for the Sub-Saharan and G7 countries, respectively. Data source is from IMF and include all 
countries listed in Table 2.1.2  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa Economies     Advanced Economies 
Benin Gabon Mauritania South Africa Canada 
Botswana Gambia  Mauritius Sudan France 
Burundi Ghana Mozambique Swaziland Germany 
Cameroon Kenya Namibia Tanzania Italy 
Central African Rep. Lesotho Niger Togo Japan 
Congo, Rep. The Liberia Rwanda Uganda United Kingdom 
Cote d'Ivoire Malawi Senegal Zambia United States 
Dem. Rep. of Congo Mali Sierra Leone  Zimbabwe   
Table 2.1. Unlucky and Lucky Economies.  
 
The time series are obtained using the empirical procedure developed by Hall and 
Jones (1995), and Caselli (2005). We assume that output Y is produced according to the 
following production function 
 1)(LhAKY                                                               (2.1) 
where K is the aggregate capital stock and Lh is the quality adjusted workforce, namely the 
number of workers L multiplied by the average human capital h, while A corresponds to 
the Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Throughout the paper we use the terms total factor 
productivity, Solow's residual, or technological progress interchangeably. In per capita 
terms the production function can be written as follows: 
 1hAkY                                                                     (2.2) 
where k is the capital labor ratio. 
As investigated by Hall and Jones (1999), and by Caselli (2005), we are initially 
interested in studying how much of the per worker income gap across countries can be 
described by each production factor (i.e. A, h and k), as defined in Eq. 2. To address the 
issue, we use the following set of info: a) the output per-worker (i.e. y); b)  the capital labor 
ratio (i.e. k); c) the total average years of schooling (i.e. h); d) the value for the capital 
share α. 
In line with the Caselli's work the data set combines variables from two sources. The 
first is version 7.0 of the PENN WORLD TABLES.  From PENN TABLES, we extract output, 
capital and the number of workers. The second is the Barro-Lee educational attainment 
data set. The latter is used to find data at educational level. Data run from 1950 or later to 
2007.3 The variable y is measured from PWT63 as  the real  GDP per worker in 
                                                          
2 Savings to GDP ratio data for Liberia and Zimbabwe are not available. Per capita GDP are based on 
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) in current international dollar. 
3 PENN TABLE starting dates (in brackets): Benin (1959), Botswana (1960), Burundi (1960), Cameroon 
(1960), Central Afr. Rep. (1960), Congo (1960), Cote d'Ivoire (1960), Dem. Rep. of Congo (1950), Gabon 
(1960), Gambia (1960), Ghana (1955), Kenya (1950), Lesotho (1960), Liberia (1970), Malawi (1954), Mali 
(1960), Mauritania (1960), Mauritius (1950), Mozambique (1960), Namibia (1960), Niger (1960), Rwanda 
(1960), Senegal (1960), Sierra Leone (1961), South Africa (1950), Sudan (1970), Swaizland (1970), Tanzania 
(1960), Togo (1960), Uganda (1950), Zambia (1955), Zimbabwe (1954), Canada (1950), France (1950), 
Germany (1970), Italy (1950), Japan (1950), UK (1950) and USA (1950). 
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international dollars (i.e. in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the original data set) . 
For more recent data on real  GDP per worker in international dollars (e.g. 2010), we use 
the International Monetary Fund Database. 
The capital stock, K, is estimated using the standard perpetual inventory equation 
1)1(  ttt KIK                                                                     (2.3) 
 
where tI is investment and  is the depreciation rate (assumed to be equal to 0.06).4 
We compute the investment series as real aggregate investment in PPP. In practice, 
kipoprgdplI  , where rgdpl, pop and ki represent, the real income per capita, the 
population (in thousands) and the investment share of PPP converted GDP per capital at 
2005 constant prices (i.e. investment share in total income), respectively. 
We estimate that the initial value of capital stock 0K is 
)(
0
g
I

where 0I ,  the value of 
the investment series in the first year,  is available (i.e. in our dataset the initial investment 
value ranges from 1950 to 1970), and g represents the average geometric growth rate for 
the investment series computed over the first twenty years of available data.  To compute 
k, we divide K by the number of workers. The latter is obtained as rgdpch·pop/rgdpwok, 
where rgdpch is real GDP per capita computed with the chain method. 
 
To construct the human capital h, we borrow the average years of schooling in the 
population over 25 years old from the Barro-Lee educational attainment data set. 
According to Hall and Jones (1999) h can be computed as follows: 
 
)(seh                                                                      (2.4) 
 
where s represents the average years of schooling and )(s is piecewise a linear 
function.5 
Notice that s is observed in the data every 5 years (i.e. 1950 - 1955 - 1960 etc…).6 As 
stated by Caselli (2005): “since s moves  slowly over time, a five-years observation can 
plausibly be employed for nearby dates as well”. The last parameter to be determined is α. 
As suggested by the literature, or the so-called stylized facts, we assume that the capital 
share is 1/3. 
The TFP A is obtained formally as: 
.
1 

hk
y
A                                                                     (2.5) 
 We also construct country-by-country ad hoc TFP shock series. To measure shocks, we 
use an indicator series that takes value 1, once an “extraordinary event” occurs, either 
                                                          
4 See Caselli (2005). 
5 The structure of the piecewise linear function )(s : ss  134.0)( if 4s , )4(101.04134.0)(  ss if 
84  s  and )8(068.04101.04134.0)(  ss if 8s (see Hall and Jones, 1999 and Caselli, 2005). 
6 See Barro and Lee website: http://www.barrolee.com/. 
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positive or negative, and 0 otherwise.  An extraordinary event is chosen as that with a TFP 
growth rate below (above) 1.43 standard deviation minus (plus) the mean of the Hodrick-
Prescott filtered TFP growth rate series. .Formally,  1 is assigned if the rate of growth of A 
is below or above the following threshold 
 
A
hp
ttShockTFP  43.1                                                             (2.6) 
 
where hpt represents the mean of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered TFP growth rate series 
and A is the standard deviation of the TFP growth rate.  
In Table 2.2, we present the average contribution of each input to income (see 
appendix A) . The decomposition is the result of the log version of Eq. 2.2, and takes the 
form: 
)log()1()log()log()log( hkAy  .                                         (2.7) 
Eq. 2.7 allows us to capture one of the key factors of the growth accounting literature. 
Our numbers suggest that income is mostly determined by capital (i.e. )log(k ) and 
technological factors (i.e. )log(A ). Over the 32 Sub-Saharan countries the fraction 
)log(
)log()1(
y
h
 is on the average equal to 3.18%. The average contribution of capital per-
worker and TFP is respectively equal to  55.28% and  41.54%. Similar results are obtained 
for the G7 economies. We argue that education, here captured by the average years of 
schooling, contributes marginally to the per-worker income wealth. The preliminary 
results of Table 2.2 pave the way to study the dynamics of the per-worker capita, 
education and TFP in as well as their implications for the huge income differences 
between Sub-Saharan and G7 economies. 
 
3. Cross-Country Income Differences: An Empirical Review 
3.1 Output, Education and TFP: Some Stylized Facts 
Output per worker varies enormously across countries. If rich and poor economies are 
compared, the gap becomes huge. Hall and Jones (1999), on an accounting basis, show that 
differences in physical capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the 
variation in output per worker. Instead, they find a large amount of variation in the level of 
the Solow residual across countries. Their main hypothesis is that differences in capital 
accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are fundamentally related to 
the differences in social infrastructure across countries. 
Caselli (2005), using the benchmark Hall and Jones' (1999) production function, comes 
into the conclusion that only a small fraction of cross-country income variance can be 
attributed to differences in (physical and human) capital. In particular, he finds that the 
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fraction of the variance of income explained by observed endowments is equal to 0.39.7 
This implies that a large portion of the variance is explained by the Solow's residual. This 
empirical regularity supports our curiosity to study deeply the impact of TFP shocks on  
income. Hall and Jones (1999) provide additional support. They argue that Countries 
produce high levels of output per worker in the long run because they achieve high rates 
of investment in physical capital and human capital, and because they use these inputs 
with a high level of productivity. 
 
Country  
)log(
)log(
y
k
 
)log(
)log()1(
y
h
 
)log(
)log(
y
A
 
Sub-Saharan Africa       
Benin 56.81 1.94 41.25 
Botswana 53.41 4.17 42.42 
Burundi 56.43 2.11 41.46 
Cameroon 53.32 3.43 43.26 
Central African Republic 56.01 2.30 41.69 
Congo, Republic The 55.81 4.01 40.19 
Cote d'Ivoire 52.25 2.49 45.27 
Democratic Republic of Congo 56.92 2.41 40.67 
Gabon 52.49 3.31 44.20 
Gambia  53.11 1.67 45.23 
Ghana 60.81 4.73 34.46 
Kenya 55.22 3.96 40.82 
Lesotho 55.11 4.92 39.97 
Liberia 60.72 3.19 36.09 
Malawi 61.79 2.80 35.41 
Mali 55.66 0.81 43.53 
Mauritania 57.20 2.70 40.09 
Mautitius 54.56 4.60 40.85 
Mozambique 56.04 1.35 42.61 
Namibia 52.92 4.39 42.68 
Niger 55.86 0.98 43.16 
Rwanda 53.18 2.31 44.52 
Senegal 53.50 3.38 43.12 
Sierra Leone  53.66 2.07 44.27 
South Africa 52.07 4.79 43.14 
Sudan 49.53 1.97 48.50 
Swaziland 53.29 4.87 41.84 
Tanzania 56.69 4.05 39.27 
Togo 56.44 3.21 40.35 
Uganda 54.61 2.92 42.47 
Zambia 54.73 4.29 40.98 
Zimbawe 58.94 5.61 35.46 
    Advanced Economies 
   Canada 49.47 6.46 44.07 
France 50.02 4.76 45.22 
Germany 50.80 5.33 43.87 
Italy 50.58 4.91 44.51 
Japan 50.61 6.25 43.14 
United Kingdom 49.01 5.57 45.43 
United States 49.45 7.03 43.52 
    Mean (32 Sub-Saharan) 55.28 3.18 41.54 
                                                          
7 Formally, Caselli (2005) uses the following measure of success: 
)]var[log(
)]var[log(
1
y
y
succes hk  where 
 1hkyhk . He refers to hky  as the factor-only model. 
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Mean (7 Developed) 49.99 5.76 44.25 
 Table 2.2. The elements of this table represent the average contribution of each input to total per-worker output  (numbers 
are expressed in percentage points). According to data availability, mean values might be computed using a different 
number of years. Series are annually and run from 1950 to 2009. Source: PENN WORLD Tables, Barro-Lee Data Set. 
 
In Table 3.1, we report the summary statistics of the population, per-worker income, 
education level and per-worker capital. The time series are obtained following the 
procedure described in Section 2. In addition, we show the average values of the 
population growth rate and of the per worker capital stock, as well as the variance of the 
TFP. Statistics are computed on a country-by-country basis. Columns three, four and six of 
Table 3.1 confirm the Hall and Jones' (1999) main results. The numbers presented in these 
columns show that the average growth rate of per-worker income is lower across unlucky 
economies than that across lucky economies (i.e. 1.060% vs 2.280%).  
 
Country  Pop.  y k  h 
 k (per 
capita) 
A Var(A) 
Sub-Saharan Africa               
Benin 2.854 1.150 1.101 1.579 580,529.9 0.225 0.277 
Botswana 2.636 6.508 11.208 4.290 2,722,750.3 1.697 0.752 
Burundi 2.399 0.895 2.537 1.400 75,800.3 -0.331 0.580 
Cameroon 2.319 1.143 3.780 2.963 785,174.8 -0.869 0.278 
Central African Republic 2.273 -0.764 -2.562 1.680 296,073.1 -0.439 0.216 
Congo, Republic The 2.716 2.213 -0.437 3.513 1,125,737.8 1.605 0.636 
Cote d'Ivoire 3.410 0.700 1.170 2.084 431,322.5 -0.252 0.237 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2.797 -1.179 -0.886 1.924 296,502.5 -1.334 1.536 
Gabon 2.227 2.298 2.344 3.509 7,436,666.3 0.419 0.683 
Gambia  3.173 1.256 4.435 1.276 194,579.3 -0.664 0.455 
Ghana 2.591 2.008 -1.164 4.052 1,087,550.4 1.537 1.326 
Kenya 3.190 0.379 -0.004 3.732 430,677.6 -0.375 0.244 
Lesotho 1.657 2.784 12.666 4.058 494,800.0 -1.418 0.538 
Liberia 2.585 -1.470 -4.900 1.995 993,403.5 -0.279 5.415 
Malawi 2.886 2.477 3.711 2.207 648,237.1 0.654 0.971 
Mali 2.220 -3.418 3.912 0.641 395,543.5 0.097 0.379 
Mauritania 1.945 2.407 1.770 2.311 1,021,951.2 1.383 0.873 
Mauritius 1.681 1.727 1.176 5.138 3,594,133.1 0.720 0.338 
Mozambique 2.160 1.837 3.414 0.022 99,453.8 0.627 0.231 
Namibia 2.604 1.104 2.028 4.569 3,497,271.6 -0.063 0.253 
Niger 2.677 -0.083 1.930 0.759 354,120.5 -0.919 0.418 
Rwanda 2.642 1.304 3.419 1.677 144,542.2 -0.345 1.666 
Senegal 2.601 0.242 2.710 2.858 406,108.6 -1.139 0.202 
Sierra Leone  1.558 1.204 4.485 1.559 247,637.8 -0.611 0.598 
South Africa 2.201 1.149 1.577 5.684 4,255,861.4 0.188 0.109 
Sudan 2.875 1.545 3.368 1.447 304,383.5 -0.010 0.924 
Swaziland 2.705 2.779 2.820 4.081 1,719,355.8 0.957 0.675 
Tanzania 2.825 0.096 4.103 3.107 232,829.8 0.096 0.181 
Togo 2.928 -0.055 1.949 2.533 621,269.6 -1.479 0.404 
Uganda 3.044 1.370 2.413 2.519 171,091.1 -0.005 0.249 
Zambia 2.806 0.826 0.035 4.007 844,676.3 0.136 0.790 
Zimbabwe 2.384 -0.512 0.743 4.353 127,199.8 -1.501 0.886 
        Advanced Economies 
       Canada 1.490 1.401 2.118 9.568 9,362,137.2 0.333 0.053 
France 0.707 2.588 3.671 6.361 9,739,378.0 0.810 0.066 
Germany 0.306 1.359 0.669 6.769 15,704,562.1 0.201 0.100 
Italy 0.424 3.240 4.400 6.535 11,348,080.5 1.275 0.057 
Japan 0.709 3.850 6.960 9.064 10,997,926.0 1.287 0.308 
United Kingdom 0.361 1.871 3.778 7.604 6,932,284.4 0.283 0.039 
United States 1.196 1.649 2.068 11.139 11,241,901.5 0.614 0.063 
        Mean(32 Sub-Saharan) 2.549 1.060 2.339 2.735 1,113,663.6 -0.053 0.729 
Sd (32 Sub-Saharan) 0.444 1.673 3.279 1.397 . . . 0.895 0.941 
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Mean (7 Advanced) 0.742 2.280 3.381 8.149 10,760,895.7 0.686 0.098 
Sd (7 Advanced) 0.448 0.972 2.032 1.816 . . . 0.457 0.094 
Table 3.1. The elements of this table represent the mean values of the rate of growth of the population ( pop ), per-worker 
real GDP ( ty ), per-worker capital ( (%)tk ), the human capital ( th ) and Solow's residual ( A ). The 5th column represents 
the mean of the per-worker capital stock (measured in millions of US dollars).  The last column display the variance of the 
TFP ( 2
A
 ).Numbers are all expressed in percentage points. Data run from 1950 or later to 2009. Sources: PENN WORLD 
Tables, Barro-Lee Data Set. 
 
As expected, according to the neoclassical growth theory, this long-run result appear to 
be unfair and counterintuitive. Why? The comparison of the average per-worker capital 
and average TFP growth rate among unlucky and lucky economies provides a clear 
answer.  Unlucky economies' average per worker capital growth rate and average TFP 
growth rate are 2.339% and -0.053%, respectively. For lucky economies we have 3.381% 
and 0.686% respectively. 
Summary statistics' heterogeneity exhists also within the Sub-Saharan area. For 
example,  per worker income ranges from $728.57 (Burundi) to $23,066.90 (Gabon), and 
the per worker capital ranges from $75,800.33 (Burundi) to $7,436,666.28 (Gabon). The 
gap with the G7 economies is still significantly high.  Per worker income interval goes from 
a min of $ 38,014.08 (Japan) to a max of $ 56,281.49 (USA); and goes from a min of 
$6,932,284.44 (UK) to a max of $15,704,562.07 (Germany) as far as per worker capital 
concerns.8 
Average years of schooling min-max intervals are: [0.02 (Mozambique) - 5.68 (South 
Africa)] and  [6.36 (France) - 11.14 (USA)].   
We obtain four main empirical facts: 1) the absolute convergence theory does not 
apply;9 2) the rate of growth of the technological progress across unlucky economies is on 
the average negative;10 3) the rate of growth of per-worker capital is negative in 6 out of 
32 unlucky economies (i.e. average negative capital accumulation); 4) the ratio between 
lucky and unlucky economies of the average per-worker capital stock is equal to ten. 
Our results largely support past empirical evidence stating that differences in physical 
capital intensity and differences in educational attainment explain only a small fraction of 
the differences in output per worker across countries. In Table 3.2, we report country-by-
country empirical counterparts of Eq. 2.2. More precisely, we weight the average 
production input of each economy i over the average production component of the US. 
Formally, 
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where the bar variables define average values. Data suggests that, under this 
benchmark production function, the TFP plays a crucial role in explaining why unlucky 
                                                          
8
 The minimum and maximum values are country specific sample averages. Data run from 1950 or later to 
2009. 
9 A detailed discussion is provided in Section 4. 
10 Negative average TFP growth rates are found in the following unlucky economies: Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe. 
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economies are not able to emerge. The average TFP weighs only 27%. Education and per 
worker capital appear to weigh more, respectively 60% and 40%.  
Hall and Jones (1999) argue that one possible interpretation of this result may rely on  
other differences, such as the quality of human capital, on-the-job training, or vintage 
effects. These inputs might be considered directly in the production function. They finally 
claim that a  theory of productivity differences is needed.  
For example, Parente and Prescott (1994) propose a theory of economic development 
in which technology adoption and barriers to such adoptions provide the main 
explanation. Based on the fact that the size of these barriers differs across countries and 
time, Parente and Prescott (1994) construct a theory where it is shown that the larger 
these barriers, the greater the investment a firm must make to adopt a more advanced 
technology. 
 
 
   
 
Country     Productivity Factors: Contribution 
      
Advanced Economies y 
 
k  1h  A 
United States 1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 
Canada 0.874 
 
0.942 0.931 0.996 
France 0.793 
 
0.934 0.776 1.093 
Germany 0.948 
 
1.132 0.836 1.002 
Italy 0.791 
 
0.974 0.785 1.035 
Japan 0.675 
 
0.918 0.892 0.825 
United Kingdom 0.760 
 
0.835 0.839 1.084 
Sub-Saharan Economies 
     Benin 0.043 
 
0.376 0.541 0.213 
Botswana 0.175 
 
0.568 0.697 0.441 
Burundi 0.013 
 
0.187 0.533 0.130 
Cameroon 0.081 
 
0.405 0.624 0.320 
Central African Republic 0.031 
 
0.297 0.551 0.191 
Congo, Republic The 0.079 
 
0.470 0.656 0.255 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.068 
 
0.338 0.571 0.354 
Democratic Republic of Congo 0.034 
 
0.300 0.551 0.204 
Gabon 0.410 
 
0.869 0.656 0.719 
Gambia  0.035 
 
0.255 0.527 0.257 
Ghana 0.036 
 
0.460 0.673 0.116 
Kenya 0.045 
 
0.341 0.640 0.205 
Lesotho 0.035 
 
0.319 0.674 0.162 
Liberia 0.047 
 
0.438 0.586 0.182 
Malawi 0.023 
 
0.378 0.569 0.109 
Mali 0.038 
 
0.323 0.493 0.241 
Mauritania 0.057 
 
0.452 0.577 0.218 
Mautitius 0.189 
 
0.687 0.713 0.386 
Mozambique 0.016 
 
0.206 0.507 0.154 
Namibia 0.231 
 
0.681 0.704 0.482 
Niger 0.037 
 
0.318 0.499 0.232 
Rwanda 0.029 
 
0.232 0.551 0.225 
Senegal 0.054 
 
0.331 0.609 0.267 
Sierra Leone  0.039 
 
0.279 0.544 0.254 
South Africa 0.309 
 
0.727 0.742 0.572 
Sudan 0.085 
 
0.300 0.549 0.514 
Swaziland 0.141 
 
0.536 0.722 0.365 
Tanzania 0.024 
 
0.273 0.624 0.143 
Togo 0.046 
 
0.378 0.600 0.202 
Uganda 0.028 
 
0.249 0.578 0.193 
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Zambia 0.074 
 
0.422 0.663 0.264 
Zimbawe 0.014 
 
0.227 0.677 0.093 
      Mean (6 Developed) 0.807 
 
0.956 0.843 1.006 
Sd (6 Developed) 0.086 
 
0.090 0.055 0.089 
Mean (32 Sub-Saharan) 0.080 
 
0.394 0.606 0.271 
Sd (32 Sub-Saharan) 0.089   0.161 0.070 0.142 
Table 3.2 . The elements of this table are the empirical counterparts to the components of Eq. 2.2, all measured as ratios to 
the U. S. values. The first column is the product of the other three columns. Data run from 1950 or later to 2009. Sources: 
PENN WORLD Tables, Barro-Lee Data Set. 
 
We find that the following inequalities hold: 
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The second and last columns of Table 3.2 support the inequalities in (3.1.2). These 
results suggest carrying out an analysis on the cross-country income differences by 
emphasizing only the role of TFP and per-worker capital gaps rather than the education 
gap. Since differences in technologies appear to be critical, the rest of the paper is devoted 
to study the impact of total factor productivity shocks on output per worker.  
 
3.2 TFP Shocks: Do They Matter? 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the TFP component results to be much more important 
than the average years of schooling in understanding cross-country per-worker income 
differences as well as in exacerbating output instability. While abstracting from the 
political or social instability issues, we focus, instead, via time series analysis, on the 
magnitude of the impact of TFP shocks on per-worker income. The time series 
environment allows us to conduct the analysis on a country-by-country basis. The TFP 
shock series is derived from the 1.43 standard deviations from the mean of the TFP 
growth rate Hodrick-Prescott filtered series (see Section 2). For each country we produce 
two series: one collects positive shocks and one collects negative shock. Shock series 
appear as 0/1 indicator variables.  
Our ad hoc shocks are indicated, on yearly basis, in Table 5 (see Appendix B). Positive 
or negative signs, reported in parentheses, confirm the presence of extreme movements, 
either positive or negative, in the TFP growth rate series. We assume that, in many 
economies, to each extreme event corresponds a financial, political or social shock. 
The effects of TFP shocks on per worker income are studied by adopting a vector 
autoregression (VAR) analysis. A simple VAR(p,k) equation can be  written formally as 
 
tktktt WXAXAX   11                                                (3.2.1) 
where tW ~ ),0( WN . In (3.2.1) tx  is a (p∙1) vector of variables and k represents the 
numbers of lags.  To evaluate  the impact of TFP shocks on per-worker income, we 
estimate a country-by-country bivariate VAR. The full set of variables used in our VARs 
are: per-worker income growth rate ( ty ) and  TFP Shock series (
ShockTFP ). In our 
specific case, the VAR specification in (3.2.1) is given by 
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where 1A is the matrix of coefficients and k is assumed to be 1.  Our VARs’ estimates are 
computed by using robust standard errors (i.e. HAC procedure). Lags k are chosen 
according to the standard AIC, BIC and HQC lag selection criteria. To compute IRFs, the 
1/0 TFP shock series is ordered last in a Cholesky decomposition. This specification 
implies that the second shock does not affect the first variable contemporaneously, but 
both shock have a contemporaneous effect on the second variable.  
The main result we achieved is that the impact of the ad hoc TFP shock series on per-
worker income is larger in the unlucky world rather than in the lucky one. Impulse 
response functions (IRFs), computed via the estimation of (3.2.1), are collected, thus 
presented, on a country-by-country basis, in Fig. A4-A7. For space reasons, we report IRFs 
to negative TFP shocks only. Once positive TFP shocks are considered, symmetric results, 
in terms of magnitude, are obtained. IRFs of Mauritania and Swaizland are not shown. The 
IRFs have a negative impact on the per-worker income growth rate. As pointed out above, 
the impact is much higher in unlucky economies rather than in lucky ones. In the unlucky 
world, the collapse of the per worker income  ranges from -2% to -8%, and from -0.1% to -
3% in the lucky world. We notice also that for some economies the impact is not 
statistically significant. Where significant, it lasts on average for 1.5 years. For lucky 
economies, statistical results are less robust. 
We argue that the high order of magnitude of the impact is mostly driven by the 
presence of a high TFP volatility level. Not surprisingly, the average TFP volatility across 
unlucky countries is roughly 8 times higher than the average volatility computed across 
lucky economies (i.e. 0.729% vs 0.098%). The presence of high TFP volatility across 
unlucky economies is confirmed. Fig. A.1-A.3 show that in the unlucky world the TFP 
growth rate fluctuates on the average around a wider band. 
 
4. The Impossible Story of Capital Accumulation 
The Sub-Saharan Africa's underdevelopment is well known. Bayraktar and Fofack 
(2011) notice that Sub-Saharan Africa is classified as the poorest region of the world, one 
that is getting poorer in the face of sustained growth and significant improvements of 
living standards in the rest of the world. They claim that this general characterisation of 
the region almost implies uniform and widespread poverty, and homogenous and stagnant 
economic growth rates. Table 4.1 shows the percentage  of population living on less than 
$2.00 a day in the major emerging and poor macro areas. The Sub-Saharan Africa, second 
only to South Asia, is the poorest area  of the world, as of 2008. In contrast to all the other 
macro areas, Table 4.1 suggest that the percentage of population living on less than $2.00 
per day in Sub-Saharan countries is remained constantly high (i.e. around 70%) for the 
last 30 years.  
Country Name 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 
East Asia & Pacific  92.4 88.3 81.6 81 75.8 64 61.7 51.9 39 33.2 
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Europe & Central Asia  8.32 6.68 6.33 6.87 9.18 11.2 12.1 7.92 4.6 2.2 
Latin America & Caribbean 23.8 26.8 22.4 22.4 21.7 21 22 22.2 16.7 12.4 
Middle East & North Africa  30.1 27.1 26.1 23.5 22.1 22.2 22 19.7 17.4 13.9 
South Asia 87.2 85.6 84.5 83.6 82.7 80.7 77.8 77.4 73.4 70.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  72.2 74.7 74.3 76 78.1 77.5 77.4 76.1 74.1 69.2 
Table 4.1.  Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population). Population below $2 a day is the percentage of the 
population living on less than $2.00 a day at 2005 international prices.  Source: WORLD BANK. 
Sach et al. (2004) point out that it is the only major developing region with negative 
growth in income per capita during 1980-2000. They argue that African countries have the 
worst health condition of the planet and suffer government crisis. Many parts of Africa are 
well governed even though stuck in poverty. Their explanation is that Africa is stuck in a 
poverty trap, too poor to achieve robust, high levels of economic growth and, in many 
places, simply too poor to grow at all.   
There is also an abundance of empirical evidence that most countries that were poor in 
the 50's remain so today. A large part of the literature support the idea that if poverty 
traps are an important feature of growth dynamics, than over time one would expect a 
bimodal distribution of per capita income, in which I have a group of poor countries 
clustered around the low-level poverty trap equilibrium and a group rich countries 
clustered around the high equilibrium.11  
Using the data from microenterprises in Mexico, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) argue 
that poverty traps might exist if there are a large fixed costs to starting a business. Jalan 
and Ravallion (2002) find that consumption growth at the household level increases with 
the local availability of geographical capital (e .g. availability of roods, the local level of 
literacy, etc.). Kraay and Raddatz (2007) study the empirical relevance of the poverty trap 
view of underdevelopment. They focus on the quantitative implications of two leading 
mechanisms generating poverty traps in aggregate growth models: low saving and low 
productivity at low levels of development. They argue that in such situations countries will 
converge to an equilibrium with low capital and output per capita, but they find little 
evidence of the existence of poverty traps based on these two broad mechanisms.  
Bayraktar and Fofack (2011) focus on the evidence that the level of per capita GDP, the 
quality of governance and the public capital stock are found to influence private capital 
accumulation. Our empirical results seem to fit well this last argument. According to their 
empirical results we also show that a low (or negative) average per worker capital stock 
accumulation, in the relatively low-income group economies, tends to push them into a 
poverty trap.  
Sach et al. (2004) claim that Africa's extreme poverty leads to low national saving rates. 
They underline that low domestic saving is not offset by large inflows of private foreign 
capital (e.g. FDI), because Africa's poor infrastructure and weak (productive) human 
capital discourage such inflows.  
                                                          
11 See Azariadis and Stachurski (2004a, b) and Quah (1993, 1996, 1997) among others. 
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To stress this crucial problem, we discuss here below a well-known theoretical 
economic results. Suppose to introduce in this unlucky environment uninsured 
idiosyncratic shocks. Specifically, assume that unlucky people, different from the lucky 
ones, receive idiosyncratic labor income shocks which are uninsured, as in a standard 
Bewley's economy. In our specific environment the uninsurable labor income shock 
reflects the fact that unlucky people are uncertain about the future return of the number of 
years invested in education, that is, about the chance to find a stable job after acheiving 
the diploma. According to Bewley (1986) and Aiyagari (1994), market incompleteness in 
combination with the possibility of being borrowing constrained in the future should push 
agents to accumulate excess capital in order to smooth consumption in the face of 
uncertain individual behavior. We claim that bad borrowing conditions, mainly 
characterized by an underdeveloped financial system, for unlucky people exacerbate the 
excess capital accumulation phenomenom. Since the capital level of unlucky people is 
much lower than that of lucky people, the saving for rainy days does not apply. Aggregate 
Sub-Saharan data on savings also suggest that the contribution of uninsured idiosyncratic 
risk to aggregate wealth accumulation is quite modest, supporting Aiyagari's (1994) 
seminal contribution.12 The failure of the precautionary savings motive confirms that 
unlucky people have nothing to save (i.e. they cannot accumulate resources for the future). 
In this simple mechanism, to avoid labor income shocks, human capital has to be wisely 
invested. Unlucky governments need to create an environment where educated people 
receive a compensation reflecting their qualifications. Empirical data on the average years 
of schooling show that an increase in the average education level took place in the last 20 
years.  But a lack in the productivity of human capital is still taking place. 
5. Conclusion 
The role of the education and the TFP in explaining cross-country income differences 
has been widely discussed and documented in the economic growth literature.13  We show 
that income inequalities are still very high between advanced and poor economies. We 
add that such inequalities are present also within the Sub-Saharan area.14 The per worker 
income average annual income ranges from a minimum of $728.57 (Burundi) to a 
maximum of $23,006.90 (Gabon). The gap with the G7 economies is significantly high. The 
per worker income interval goes from a minimum of $ 38,014.08 (Japan) to a maximum of 
$56,281.49 (USA). Differences in average years of schooling are also captured.15 We show 
that the average per-worker income growth rate is negative in 7 Sub-Saharan countries 
(i.e. Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Togo, 
Zimbabwe).   
                                                          
12 Recall that average savings to GDP ratio over the period 1980-2011 in the Sub-Saharan zone is 
approximately equal to 15%. In contrast, the lucky world displays a value around 21%. 
13 See Caselli (2005), Hall and Jones (1999), and Sachs (2001), among many others. 
14 The average standard deviation of the per worker income growth rate across the 32 Sub-Saharan 
countries is 1.7% and 0.97% across the G7 economies. 
15 Average years of schooling min-max intervals: [0.02 (Mozambique) - 5.68 (South Africa)] and [6.36 (France) 
- 11.14 (USA)]. 
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In this simple work, we confirm that the TFP (i.e. Solow's residual) explains a larger 
portion of the per worker income gap between Sub-Saharan and G7 economies than the 
education (i.e. average years of schooling). On average the TFP in the unlucky world 
accounts only for 27% of the US TFP. Capital and education account for 39.4% and 60% 
respectively. Income inequalities are mostly driven by differences in technological 
progress and capital. Education accounts only residually. We show that the negative TFP 
shocks further depress the per capita income in the Sub-Saharan zone. The magnitude of 
the impulse generated by the shock is on the average much higher in the unlucky world 
than in the lucky one. The order of magnitude of the impact is affected by the TFP volatility 
level, or simply the effect of a TFP shock on a relative low per worker income growth rate 
is higher than in an economy with high per worker income growth rate. To conclude, we 
argue that huge differences in per-worker capital and very low level in human capital 
productivity justify the presence of the poverty trap. 
 
 
Appendix A: The TFP Shocks 
 
Country Productivity Shocks           
United States 1951(+), 1954(-), 1962(+), 1970(-), 1974(-), 1975(-), 1980(-), 1984(+), 2009(-) 
Canada 1950(+), 1951(+), 1952(+), 1954(-), 1956(+), 1957(-), 1962(+), 1964(+), 1975(-), 1980(-), 
1982(-), 1990(-), 1991(-), 2005(-), 2009(-) 
France 1956(+), 1960(+), 1975(-), 1985(-), 1990(-), 1995(-), 2009(-) 
Germany 1990(-), 2005(-), 2009(-) 
Italy 1951(+), 1961(+), 1966(+), 1968(+), 1975(-), 1990(-) 
Japan 1950(+), 1965(+), 1970(-) 
United Kingdom 1965(-), 1973(+), 1975(-), 1980(-), 1986(+), 1994(+), 2009(-) 
    Benin 1975(-), 1979(+), 1982(+), 1983(-), 2005(-), 2008(-) 
Botswana 1965(-), 1969(-), 1972(+), 1975(-), 1985(-), 1989(+), 1990(-), 1995(-), 1997(+) 
Burundi 1961(-), 1970(+), 1995(-), 1997(+) 
Cameroon 1967(-), 1976(-), 1977(+), 1978(+), 1988(-), 1990(-) 
Central African Republic 1969(+), 1980(-), 1983(-), 1984(+), 1990(-), 1996(-), 1997(+), 2003(-), 2007(+) 
Congo, Republic The 1973(+), 1975(-), 1979(+), 1985(-), 2007(-) 
Cote d'Ivoire 1964(+), 1965(-), 1968(+), 1980(-), 1982(+), 1989(+) 
Dem. Rep. of Congo 1991(-), 1992(-), 1997(-), 1999(-), 2000(-), 2001(+) 
Gabon 1974(+), 1976(+), 1977(-), 1978(-), 1987(-), 1997(+), 1999(-) 
Gambia  1975(+), 1980(-), 1982(+), 1983(-), 1995(-), 2005(+), 2007(+) 
Ghana 1956(+), 1962(+), 1964(+), 1965(-), 1966(+), 1967(-), 1968(+), 1971(+), 1975(-) 
Kenya 1951(+), 1952(-), 1962(+), 1966(+), 1970(-), 1975(-), 1985(-), 1986(+) 
Lesotho 1961(-), 1971(-), 1972(+), 1973(+), 1975(-), 1978(+), 1979(-) 
Liberia 1990(-), 1992(-), 1997(+) 
Malawi 1959(-), 1960(+), 1962(-), 1965(+), 1978(+), 1981(-), 1994(-) 
Mali 1964(-), 1974(-), 1975(+), 1976(+), 1980(-), 1986(+), 2000(-) 
Mauritania 1964(+), 2006(+) 
Mauritius 1960(-), 1968(-), 1972(+), 1973(+), 1976(+), 1980(-) 
Mozambique 1967(+), 1970(-), 1982(-), 1983(-), 1992(-), 2001(+), 2002(+) 
Namibia 1962(+), 1964(+), 1985(-), 1987(+), 1993(-), 2006(+) 
Niger 1973(-), 1980(-), 1984(-), 1990(-), 1998(+), 2008(+) 
Rwanda 1981(+), 1994(-), 1995(+) 
Senegal 1969(-), 1973(-), 1976(+), 1978(-), 1979(+), 1980(-), 1982(+), 1984(-), 1994(+) 
Sierra Leone  1967(-), 1996(-), 1997(-), 2001(+), 2002(+) 
South Africa 1953(+), 1982(-), 1985(-), 1986(-), 1990(-), 1995(-), 2000(+), 2005(+) 
Sudan 1983(-), 1987(+), 1996(+), 2002(-), 2004(+) 
Swaziland 1972(+), 1973(-), 1974(+) 
Tanzania 1961(-), 1964(+), 1970(-), 1991(+), 1993(-), 2005(+), 2008(+) 
Togo 1977(+), 1980(-), 1981(-), 1993(-), 1994(+) 
Uganda 1951(+), 1953(-), 1979(-), 1985(-), 1994(+), 1995(-) 
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Zambia 1982(-), 2004(+), 2007(+) 
Zimbabwe 1969(+), 1970(+), 1981(+), 1984(-), 1989(+), 1992(-), 2003(-), 2004(-) 
Table A.1. Total Factor Productivity Shocks: Positive or negative signs (in parentheses) confirm the presence of extreme 
movements in the TFP growth rate series. A (+) is assigned when  A
hp
A
RateGrowthTFP  43.1 and a (-) is assigned 
when A
hp
A
RateGrowthTFP  43.1 . The variable 
hp
A
 represents the sample mean of the TFP growth rate Hodrick-
Prescott filtered series. Dates. Sources: PENN WORLD Tables, Barro-Lee Dataset. 
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Figure A.1: The Dynamic of the TFP Growth Rate (a) 
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Figure A.2: The Dynamic of the TFP Growth Rate (b) 
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Figure A.3: The Dynamic of the TFP Growth Rate (c) 
19 
 
 
Figure A.4: Sub-Saharan Economies IRFs: VAR estimation of the impact of 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator on per-worker 
income growth rate. The variable y is from PWT63 PENN TABLE, and represent the real GDP per worker in international 
dollars (i.e. in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the original data set).  Notes: shaded areas are 95% confidence bands 
around the response to 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator. From top left: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Cote d' Ivoire, Dem. Rep. Congo, Gabon and Gambia. Data run from 1950 or later to 2009. 
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Figure A.5: Sub-Saharan Economies IRFs: VAR estimation of the impact of 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator on per worker 
income growth rate. The variable y is from PWT63 PENN TABLE, and represent the real GDP per worker in international 
dollars (i.e. in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the original data set).  Notes: shaded areas are 95% confidence bands 
around the response to 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator. From top left: Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and Niger. Mauritania's IRF is not showed (no 1/0 negative shocks). Data run from 1950 or 
later to 2009. 
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Figure A.6: Sub-Saharan Economies IRFs: VAR estimation of the impact of 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator on per worker 
income growth rate. The variable y is from PWT63 PENN TABLE, and represent the real GDP per worker in international 
dollars (i.e. in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the original data set).  Notes: shaded areas are 95% confidence bands 
around the response to 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator. From top left: Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Swaizland IRF is not showed (invertibility condition is not satified). Data run 
from 1950 or later to 2009. 
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Figure A.7: G7 Economies IRFs: VAR estimation of the impact of 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator on per worker income 
growth rate. The variable y is from PWT63 PENN TABLE, and represent the real GDP per worker in international dollars (i.e. 
in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the original data set).  Notes: shaded areas are 95% confidence bands around the 
response to 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator. From top left: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and 
USA. Data run from 1950 or later to 2009. 
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